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In this paper, we propose a novel paper fingerprinting technique based on analyzing the translucent pat-
terns revealed when a light source shines through the paper. These patterns represent the inherent texture
of paper, formed by the random interleaving of wooden particles during the manufacturing process. We show
these patterns can be easily captured by a commodity camera and condensed into to a compact 2048-bit fin-
gerprint code. Prominent works in this area (Nature 2005, IEEE S&P 2009, CCS 2011) have all focused on
fingerprinting paper based on the paper “surface”. We are motivated by the observation that capturing the
surface alone misses important distinctive features such as the non-even thickness, the random distribution
of impurities, and different materials in the paper with varying opacities. Through experiments, we demon-
strate that the embedded paper texture provides a more reliable source for fingerprinting than features on
the surface. Based on the collected datasets, we achieve 0% false rejection and 0% false acceptance rates. We
further report that our extracted fingerprints contain 807 degrees-of-freedom (DoF), which is much higher
than the 249 DoF with iris codes (that have the same size of 2048 bits). The high amount of DoF for texture-
based fingerprints makes our method extremely scalable for recognition among very large databases; it also
allows secure usage of the extracted fingerprint in privacy-preserving authentication schemes based on error
correction techniques.
CCS Concepts: •Security and privacy→ Biometrics; Tamper-proof and tamper-resistant designs;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: paper fingerprint, Physical Unclonable Function, biometric, counterfeit-
ing
1. INTRODUCTION
Secure paper documents. Designing secure documents that provide high levels of
security against physical forgery is a long-standing problem. Even in today’s digital
age, this problem remains important as physical paper is still prevalently used in
our daily lives as a means to prove data authenticity, for example, in receipts, con-
tracts, certificates, and passports. A recent trend in this area (e.g., in e-passports) is
to embed electronics such as RFID chips within the physical document in question
[Juels et al. 2005]. However, the security of such solutions depends on the tamper-
resistance of the chip which must securely store a long-term secret [Chothia and
Smirnov 2010]. This tamper-resistance requirement can significantly increase the cost
of production. In view of the importance of ensuring the authenticity of paper docu-
ments, researchers have been exploring applying digital technologies to prevent coun-
terfeiting. One promising method is based on measuring the unique physical proper-
ties of paper that are impossible to clone.
Paper fingerprinting. Manufacturing a paper sheet is a complex process and each
paper sheet is a unique product from that process. Typically, wooden particles are used
as the base, and multiple substances are subsequently applied to stick these particles
together to stabilize their placement and shape a thin, usually white, steady surface
which we call paper.
In an article published in Nature in 2005, Buchanan et al. observed that the surface
of a paper sheet is imperfect – it contains random non-evenness as a natural outcome
of the paper manufacturing process [Buchanan et al. 2005]. They propose to utilize the
surface imperfections to uniquely identify the paper. Their method is to use a focused
laser beam to scan a pre-designated region on the paper sheet from four different
angles, and continuously record the intensity of the reflected laser. The recordings
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(a) Paper Surface (b) Paper Texture
Fig. 1: The surface and texture of the same area of a paper sheet as captured by a
camera based on a) reflective and b) transmissive light.
then constitute a unique digital representation of the paper, called “paper fingerprint”.
Therefore, Buchanan et al.’s method [Buchanan et al. 2005] is the basis of a number of
follow-up works, notably [van Beijnum et al. 2006; Samsul et al. 2010].
Clarkson et al. (IEEE S&P, 2009) subsequently showed that a commodity scanner
could be used to effectively extract paper fingerprints based on the same surface im-
perfections [Clarkson et al. 2009]. Their method is to scan the paper surface from four
different angles and then construct a 3-D model. Then the 3-D model is condensed into
a concise feature vector, which forms the paper fingerprint.
Later, Sharma et al. (CCS, 2011) proposed another approach named PaperSpeckle,
which uses a microscope with a built-in LED as the light source to extract the pa-
per speckle patterns at the microscopic level (1–2 microns) [Sharma et al. 2011]. The
underlying idea in PaperSpeckle is based on the concept of speckles: i.e., when light
falls on a paper sheet, the scattered light forms randomly mixed bright and dark re-
gions, which can then be captured by a microscope. The captured image can be further
processed to produce a compact binary fingerprint.
Our idea. So far, prominent works in this area have primarily focused on the imper-
fections of the paper surface. In contrast, our work is inspired by the observation that
the wooden particles constituting the building blocks of a paper sheet scatter over the
paper quite irregularly. We hypothesize that this irregular placement of wooden parti-
cles provides a unique pattern, which can be extracted and used as a paper fingerprint.
We call the unique pattern caused by the random interleaving of wooden particles the
texture of paper.
Unlike previous works that measure the paper surface characteristics, we propose to
fingerprint a paper sheet based on measuring the paper texture patterns. We capture
the texture by putting a light source on one side of the paper and using a commodity
camera to take a photograph on the other side. This is intuitively based on the com-
mon observation that putting a paper sheet under light will immediately reveal rich
irregular textural patterns visible even to the naked eye. Figure 1 shows the difference
between photos taken of the paper surface (based on reflective light) and of the paper
texture (based on transmissive light).
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
— We revisit paper fingerprinting and propose to use the textural patterns revealed by
passing light through a paper sheet as a reliable source for extracting a fingerprint,
as opposed to previous measures which are based on paper surface imperfections.
— We design an efficient paper fingerprinting algorithm based on error correction and
image processing techniques, and carry out experiments to show that our method can
be used to efficiently extract a reliable and unique fingerprint using a photo taken by
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an off-the-shelf camera. Our proposed method is feasible and inexpensive to deploy
in practice.
— We conduct further experiments to demonstrate that our method is robust against:
(a) non-ideal photo capturing settings such as when the paper is rotated and the light
source is changed, and (b) non-ideal paper handling situations such as crumpling,
soaking, heating and scribbling on the surface.
2. PAPER TEXTURE
When light falls on an object, it is partly absorbed, partly reflected, and partly trans-
mitted, and paper is no exception. Absorption occurs based on the resonance principle:
the energy of the light waves of a specific frequency is absorbed and transformed into
kinetic energy by electrons of the same frequency. The part that is not absorbed, is
either reflected or transmitted depending on how opaque (or conversely transparent)
the paper is.
Different types of paper behave differently in terms of how much light they absorb,
reflect or transmit. This behaviour depends, among other factors, on pulp material,
density, thickness and coating substances. Opacity, as defined by the ISO 2471 stan-
dard [ISO 2008], can be seen as an indicator of how much light is impeded from trans-
mitting through the paper, with the opacity of 100% defined for fully opaque papers.
Typical office printing paper, with grammage between 75 to 105 g/m2, has opacity
between 86% to 94%. To put this in perspective, opacity for newsprint paper (typical
grammage: 40–49 g/m2) is in the range 90–94% and for tracing paper (typical gram-
mage: 60–110 g/m2) is in the range 24–40% [Goyal 2015]. These values suggest that a
considerable proportion of light transmits through such paper, which forms the basis
of our proposal to fingerprint paper based on its textural patterns.
Intuitively, the textural patterns created and stabilized throughout the paper in
the process of manufacturing can provide a promising source for paper fingerprinting.
These patterns are naturally occurring and appear random. Moreover, they are embed-
ded within the bonded structure of the paper and hence are relatively well-protected
against manual handling of paper. They are generated as a result of the wooden par-
ticles randomly interleaved during the manufacturing process. Finally, once in the fin-
ished product, the randomly interleaved wooden particles can not be altered without
damaging the paper, hence making any tampering act evident.
To capture the embedded textural patterns of paper and subsequently extract a
fingerprint, we limit ourselves to a single photo taken by a commodity camera. This
makes our solution more practical and quicker than the previous proposal [Clarkson
et al. 2009] that has to take multiple scans (on paper surface) from four different an-
gles in order to compute a fingerprint. We note that a single photo is feasible in our
case because the paper texture contains richer features than the paper surface, such
as the thickness of the overlaying wooden particles, randomly distributed impurities,
and different embedded materials with varying opacities. In the rest of the paper, we
conduct experiments to show that we can reliably extract a paper fingerprint from the
textural patterns.
Applications. A vast number of official and legal documents, certificates, official
receipts and invoices are printed on regular office paper (sometimes with watermarks,
holograms or other security measures), thermal paper, or other types of paper. A prop-
erty that the majority of these types of paper have in common is that they are not
completely opaque. This means that a considerable amount of light passes through
them. Furthermore, embedded irregular textural patterns as a natural result of the
manufacturing process seem to be a universal property of all these different types of
paper. Consequently, there is considerable potential for exploiting paper fingerprints
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Fig. 2: Step-by-step rotation recognition process in the preparation phase. The last
step produces a mask that distinguishes the pixels containing reliable information
suitable for feature extraction (black region) from the pixels containing unreliable in-
formation (white region).
extracted from embedded textural patterns in order to validate the authenticity of such
official and legal documents.
3. TEXTURE ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss a high level description of our proposed method for capturing
paper textural patterns and extracting a reliable and unique paper fingerprint from
those patterns. To be able to capture paper textural patterns, we take a digital photo-
graph of the paper sheet through which light is projected. Then, we need to perform
a series of preparation operations such as aligning and resizing of the original image.
Afterwards, in the texture analysis phase, we utilize 2-D Gabor filter [Daugman 1985]
to extract textural information from the captured image. Subsequently, we propose
a simple paper fingerprint extraction method that generates a binary string, the pa-
per fingerprint. Once paper fingerprints are in the binary string format, they can be
compared using well-known methods, such as computing the fractional Hamming dis-
tance between any two paper fingerprints. In the following, we give more details about
the preparation phase, Gabor transform, the fingerprint generation method, and the
fingerprint comparison method based on fractional Hamming distance. Further imple-
mentation details and settings of our experiments will be discussed in Section 4.
3.1. Preparation Phase
The preparation phase consists of operations of identifying the designated area of the
photo which is to be used for fingerprint extraction and aligning the image in terms of
movement and rotation. To indicate the fingerprinting area, we print a small rectan-
gular box on the paper sheet. In addition, we print a filled square on the bottom left of
the box, to allow automatic alignment by our implementation.
As shown in Figure 2, aligning the rotation of the image involves several steps.
First, we start with a photo of the fingerprinting area. The photo is converted into
grey scale. The printed region (the rectangular box and the filled square) can be easily
identified by applying a grey-scale threshold. This threshold is computed by the Otsu
method [Otsu 1975], which chooses the threshold in a such way to minimize the in-
terclass variance of black and white pixels. We have applied the same approach for
both reflection and transmission analyses. We observe that the borders in both reflec-
tion and transmission samples were recognized correctly using this technique. The
result is a binary image: “0” for black and “1” for white. This simple thresholding may
also produce some “noise” scattered around the image, but they can be easily removed
based on area. To ensure the borders of the printed rectangle are connected, we draw
a convex hull of the outer pixels to form a connected shape. This process also identifies
artefacts, e.g., caused by pen scribbling as we will test in the robustness experiments.
The pixel positions of identified artefacts are defined in a mask function, which we
explain below.
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Once the printed rectangle is identified, we fill up the region within the rectangular
border with the binary value ‘1’ (white). We identify the centre of mass of the rectan-
gular object based on computing the first-order moment [Teague 1980] and use that
as the new origin of the Cartesian coordinate system. This corrects any misalignment
due to paper movement.
Then, we need to correct any misalignment caused by rotation. This is based on
computing second-order moments [Teague 1980] in the new Cartesian coordinate sys-
tem. Let B(x, y) denote the binary 2D object in Cartesian coordinates representing the
recognized rectangular box area. There are three second-order moments as follows:
u20 =
∫∫
x2B(x, y) dx dy
u11 =
∫∫
x y B(x, y) dx dy
u02 =
∫∫
y2B(x, y) dx dy
The rotation of the binary 2D object B(x, y) can now be calculated as follows:
θ =
1
2
tan−1
(
2u11
(u20 − u02) +
√
(u02 − u20)2 + 4u211
)
(1)
The above formula – based on a method originally proposed by Teague [Teague 1980] –
calculates the angle between the x axis and the major axis of an ellipse that has equal
second moments to the recognized rectangular box. It gives us the counter-clockwise
rotation of the object with respect to the horizon. After θ is calculated, the image can
be rotated accordingly.
It is worth noting that in the captured image, the borders of the rectangles are
slightly curved rather than being straight due to lens artefact. This slight curvature
does not affect our alignment algorithm. We use the raw bitmap image acquired from
the camera instead of the processed jpeg image. This raw image is stored separately
in the camera in the “.rw2” format and contains the raw information captured by the
camera sensor without any processing.
After rotation is corrected, the image is delimited to the lowest and highest x and y
values of the coordinates of the pixels inside the recognized rectangular box. This im-
age is denoted by I(x, y). Meanwhile, the mask for the image is calculated as M(x, y).
This mask is a binary vector with the same dimensions as I(x, y) with the value ‘0’
indicating the corresponding pixel in I(x, y) to be masked out from the Hamming dis-
tance computation. In general, two categories of pixels are chosen to be masked out
in our procedure. The first is the pixels with the intensity greater than the threshold
computed by the Otsu method [Otsu 1975] and not considered as “scattered noise” in
the border recognition phase. These include the printed rectangle, the filled square in-
side the box and any artefacts such as random pen scribbling. The second is the pixels
outside the recognized box including all the edges in the picture. See the last diagram
in Fig. 2 for an illustration. These pixels are considered to contain unreliable informa-
tion. They are identified as ‘0’ in a binary mask vector (similar to the identification of
eyelids and eyelashes in iris recognition [Daugman 2003]) and will be excluded in the
subsequent Hamming distance comparison process.
3.2. Gabor Filter
Gabor filters are mainly used for edge detection in image processing. Besides, they
have been found to perform efficiently in texture discrimination. Gabor filters are able
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to extract both coherent and incoherent characteristics of textural patterns [Daugman
1993]. Coherent properties are the patterns which remain unchanged between snap-
shots of the same sample while incoherent ones refer to the patterns which change be-
tween snapshots of different samples. The two dimensional Gabor wavelets are popular
in biometric recognition problems such as iris recognition [Daugman 2003], fingerprint
recognition [Lee et al. 1999] and face recognition [Liu and Wechsler 2002]. A Gabor fil-
ter’s impulse response is basically that of a Gaussian filter modulated by a sinusoidal
wave. Consequently, Gabor filters capture features in both the frequency and spatial
domains. Generally speaking, a Gabor filter would consider the frequency of a pattern
(“what”) as well as the two-dimensional (2D) position of the pattern (“where”) [Daug-
man 1993]. Let exp be the natural exponential function. The 2D Gabor wavelet is cal-
culated as follows using Cartesian coordinates:
G(x, y) =
f2
piηγ
· exp
(
η2x′2 + γ2y′2
2σ2
)
· exp (2piifx′) (2)
for x′ = x cos(θ) + y sin(θ) and y′ = −x sin(θ) + y cos(θ)
where f is the frequency of the sinusoidal wave, η and γ are constant factors that
together determine the spatial ellipticity of the Gabor wavelet, θ represents the orien-
tation of the ellipticity, and σ is the standard deviation of the Gaussian envelope.
Depending on the frequency of the sinusoidal wave and the orientation of their el-
lipticity, Gabor filters are capable of discriminating different textural characteristics.
Usually, Gabor filters with a range of different frequencies, known as scales, and a
range of different orientations are applied to find out the best combination of scale and
orientation for a specific texture analysis problem. For a fixed maximum frequency
fmax and a maximum of U scales, each scale index u defines the frequency f used in
Equation 2 as follows:
∀u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , U} : f = fmax√
2
u−1 (3)
For a maximum of V orientations, we consider V angles equally distributed from 0 to
pi. Each orientation index v defines the orientation θ used in Equation 2 as follows:
∀v ∈ {1, 2, . . . , V } : θ = v − 1
V
pi (4)
We apply a Gabor filter to grey-scale images. Let I(x, y) represent the grey-scale
image using Cartesian coordinates. The result of the application of Gabor filter G(x, y)
is simply the 2D convolution of I and G as follows:
C(x, y) = I(x, y) ∗G(x, y) =
∫∫
I(x, y) G(x− η, y − ξ) dη dξ
The result C(x, y) is a complex number for each x and y. C(x, y) can be alternatively
viewed as a matrix with the discrete values of x and y mapped to the columns and
rows. Throughout the paper, we use functions defined over Cartesian coordinates and
matrices interchangeably.
3.3. Fingerprint Generation
Our fingerprint generation method takes the output of a Gabor filter and produces a
binary string. Let the element located in row j and column k of the matrix C(x, y) be
mjk = a+ bi. We define a 2-bit Gray code based on which quarter of the complex plane
the element mjk = a + bi falls in (see Figure 3). For example, when a and b are both
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Re
code = 11code = 01
code = 00 code = 10
Fig. 3: Gray code for a complex value mij = a+ bi in the complex plain.
positive, the encoded value will be 11. Thus, every element in the matrix is replaced by
two bits. The result is a binary string which we call the paper fingerprint.
3.4. Fractional Hamming Distance
After paper fingerprints are generated, fractional Hamming distance between any two
fingerprints can be used to compare them. Hamming distance is simply the number
of positions in which the bits disagree between two fingerprints. This is a classical
bit error rate (BER) metric in communication. Fractional Hamming distance is the
normalized version, resulting a value between 0 and 1. Usually masking is used to
discard the effect of irrelevant bits in a fingerprint. For each fingerprint, a mask is
defined as a binary string of the same length in which bits corresponding irrelevant
positions are set to 0 and bits corresponding effective positions are set to 1. The masks
are calculated in the preparation phase as discussed above. Given two fingerprints f1
and f2, and their corresponding masks m1 and m2, the fractional Hamming distance
is calculated as follows:
HD(f1, f2,m1,m2) =
‖(f1 ⊕ f2) ∩m1 ∩m2‖
‖m1 ∩m2‖ (5)
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR) operation and ∩ denotes the bitwise
AND operation. A relatively small fractional Hamming distance indicates that the
two fingerprints are likely to belong to the same paper sheet, while a relatively large
fractional Hamming distance (around 0.5) indicates that the two fingerprints are likely
to belong to different paper sheets. In the rest of the paper, we simply use Hamming
distance (or HD for short) to refer to fractional Hamming distance.
4. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate our suggested method for paper fingerprinting, we collected sev-
eral datasets in different situations. In this section, we first explain the parameter
settings and experiment configurations under which we carried out our evaluations.
Then, we provide the details of the evaluation framework that we use to assess the
results of our experiments. In particular, we consider metrics used for evaluating the
effectiveness of biometric systems as well as those used for evaluating the effective-
ness of physical unclonable functions (PUFs), since paper fingerprints can be seen as
both. Subsequently, we give results that justify the choices we had to make in terms
of how we collect our datasets and settings we use for Gabor filter. Finally, we give
the details of our main dataset collection and provide the results of our experiments,
including evaluation of the proposed method against biometric and PUF metrics.
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4.1. Parameter Settings & Experiment Configurations
In order to obtain consistent fingerprints, we require that a relatively small but fixed
part of a sheet of paper is used as a source of fingerprint extraction. We chose to print
a rectangular box (37mm×57mm) on the sheet to indicate this area. In addition, we
printed a small filled square (5mm×5mm) at the bottom left of the box (see Figure 10).
Using this small square, in our preparation phase our method can check that the ro-
tation has been carried out correctly (distinguishing cases when the paper is placed
upside-down or flipped).
The original photos in our experiments are all 3456×4608 pixels. After the prepa-
ration phase, we get a corrected and delimited image of variable size, ranging be-
tween around 2300×3300 pixels to 2350×3350 pixels. This image is then resized to
a 640×640 pixel image I which is then given as input to Gabor filter. The rectangular
size conversion is for the convenience of applying Gabor wavelets in the next stage to
produce 2048 bits in the output (the same size as an iris code). We use a Gabor impulse
response of size 100×100 and the output of Gabor filter in our experiments, C, is a
complex matrix of size 640×640. This matrix is downsampled to one of size 32×32, be-
fore being given as input to the fingerprint generation algorithm. This downsampling
process is done by simply picking the elements in every 20th row and 20th column.
Fingerprint generation replaces each complex value with two bits. Hence, the final
paper fingerprint is a string of the size 2×32×32=2048 bits.
We chose to downsample the output of the Gabor filter for two reasons. First, it
makes the data storage more compact. With 2048 bits (256 bytes), we are able to store
the fingerprint in a QR code as part of an authentication protocol (we will explain the
protocol in more detail in Section 6). Second, adjacent pixels in the image are usually
highly correlated. Hence, downsampling serves to break the correlation between bits.
Through experiments, we found this simple downsampling technique was effective to
produce reliable and unique fingerprints.
All images have been captured by a Panasonic DMC-FZ72 camera with a resolution
of 16.1 Mega-pixels. We chose this camera for two main reasons: the ability to capture
a photo in macro mode from a short distance (minimum 1 cm focus) and the ability to
mount a macro flash ring over the lens. However, these characteristics are not unique
to this specific camera and many other cameras available in the market provide the
same characteristics. We mounted an off-the-shelf common macro flash ring on the
camera lens, to maintain a constant distance between the lens and the paper surface
where the texture is photographed. The camera and its accessories are shown in Figure
4(a). In our experiments, we do not use the flash of the macro flash ring; the light
source is an ordinary office overhead projector as shown in Figure 4(b). The light that
the overhead projector provides is intense and adjustable. Furthermore, it has a flat
surface with constant distance from the light source. This allows us to put the paper
on the surface and then the macro ring resting on top of it before the camera takes a
photo of the paper texture. The use of the macro ring also serves to shield the effects
of other ambient light sources (e.g., daylight, office lighting). In Section 5.3, we will
explain the effect of the light source by using an alternative source: a commodity light
box (tracing pad) as shown in Figure 4(c).
Our evaluations were performed on a PC with an Intel Core i7-2600S CPU @
2.80 GHz with 8 GB of memory. The operating system was 64-bit Windows 7 Enter-
prise and we used Matlab R2015a (64-bit) to develop our algorithms.
4.2. Evaluation Framework
Our work is closely related to the fields of biometrics and Physical Unclonable Func-
tions (PUFs). Biometrics is the science of authenticating humans by measuring their
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(a) Camera and macro
flash ring.
(b) Overhead projector as
light source.
(c) Light box (tracing
pad) as light source.
Fig. 4: The equipment used in our experiments.
unique characteristics and have a long history of research. A paper fingerprint works
similar to biometrics, except that it measures unique characteristics of a physical ob-
ject instead of a human being. Hence, common metrics that measure the error rate
performance of a biometric system apply to our work too. On the other hand, paper
fingerprints are related to Physical Unclonable Functions, which is a relatively new
field starting from Pappu et al.’s seminal paper published in Science in 2002 [Pappu
et al. 2002]. Typically PUFs require a challenge and response dynamic, but according
to the definition by Maes in [Maes 2012], paper can be regarded as a “non-intrinsic”
PUF, i.e., a PUF that does not contain the circuitry to produce the response on its own.
Hence, the same evaluation methods in PUF are also applicable to paper fingerprints.
Because of the close relation to these two fields and their respective evaluation
frameworks, we evaluate our method based on metrics used in both fields for a com-
prehensive analysis. We note that previous works either use biometric or PUF metrics,
however using both allows us to perform a meaningful comparison with related biomet-
rics and PUF systems. It would be interesting to study the relationships between these
metrics and define a unified framework that can be applied to evaluate both biometric
and PUF systems. We leave this to future work.
In the following we give a brief description of these metrics. We discuss Hamming
distance distributions, decidability, and recognition rates including false rejection and
false acceptance rates in the former category of metrics. In the latter category, we
consider uniformity and randomness in the space dimension, reliability and steadiness
in the time dimension, and uniqueness and bit aliasing in the device dimension.
1) Biometric Metrics: A biometric authentication problem is a specific case of a
statistical decision problem in which one decides if two given biometric measurements
belong to the same source or not. In order to provide necessary information about the
effectiveness of such a biometric, the parameters of the so-called biometric decision
landscape need to be specified [Daugman 2000]. If Hamming distance is used for com-
parison, as it is in our case, the distributions of Hamming distance for two groups of
comparisons need to be determined: for comparisons between paper fingerprints orig-
inating from the same paper sheet, and for comparisons between paper fingerprints
originating from different paper sheets. These are called same-group and different-
group distributions, respectively.
For an effective biometric, the same-group and different-group distributions should
be well-separated. This makes the decision problem solvable. Let µ1 and µ2 denote
the means, and σ1 and σ2 the standard deviations of the two distributions. Daugman
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defines the decidability metric d′ as follows [Daugman 2004]:
d′ =
|µ1 − µ2|√
σ12+σ22
2
(6)
where | · | denotes absolute value. Decidability as defined above is indicative of how
well-separated the two distributions are: the further and the more concentrated the
distributions are, the higher will the decidability be. To give an idea about typical
values, the decidability of iris recognition, a well-established and effective biometric
method, is d′ ≈ 14 in an ideal measurement environment and d′ ≈ 7 in a non-ideal
environment [Daugman 2004].
After determining the same-group and different-group distributions, one decides a
threshold value situated between the two distributions. Subsequently, the decision on
whether two reported biometrics belong to the same origin or not is then made by
computing the Hamming distance between the two biometric samples and comparing
it to the threshold. For an effective biometric, measurements from the same origin
have relatively low Hamming distance and hence fall below the threshold, whereas
measurements from different origins have relatively high Hamming distance and fall
above the threshold. If the distributions are completely separated, the decision is cor-
rect all the time. However in practice usually there is some overlap between the two
distributions. The proportion of biometrics from different origins falsely accepted as
being from the same origin is known as the false acceptance rate (FAR). The propor-
tion of biometrics from the same origin falsely rejected as being from different origins
is known as the false rejection rate (FRR). For an effective biometric FAR and FRR
should be low – ideally zero.
A widely used measure of effectiveness of a biometric is degrees of freedom (DoF).
DoF is a measure of the combinatorial complexity of the biometric test, or in other
words the number of bits in a biometric measurement that are independent [Daugman
2004]. Consider a biometric that provides degrees of freedom N , that is, N indepen-
dent and unpredictable bits. A comparison between two such biometrics from different
origins can be modelled as the probability that a threshold number of N independently
chosen bits agree. Hence, the different-group distribution for such a biometric would
follow the binomial distribution with mean µ = p and variance σ2 = Np(1−p), where p
is the probability of single bit agreement. Hence, the degrees of freedom for a biomet-
ric with a different-group distribution that follows a binomial distribution with mean
µ and variance σ2 can be calculated as follows:
N =
µ(1− µ)
σ2
(7)
2) PUF Metrics. Paper fingerprinting can be seen as an optical physical unclonable
function (PUF) [Pappu et al. 2002], as pointed out in the literature [Maes 2012; Maes
2013]. However, previous works on paper fingerprinting did not evaluate their results
in this context. We believe that evaluating our results against established PUF metrics
provides further information about the effectiveness of our method and helps put our
results in perspective within PUF literature.
We follow the unified framework put forward by Maiti et al. [Maiti et al. 2013].
This framework provides metrics to evaluate a PUF in three dimensions: space, time,
and device. In our case, PUFs are the paper fingerprints, and devices are the different
paper sheets. Each of these dimensions quantifies a specific quality of a fingerprint: the
space dimension analyses the overall variations of fingerprints, the time dimension
indicates same-group consistency, and the device dimension discusses the different-
group diversity of fingerprints.
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Before describing these dimensions, let us define the symbols we use in this frame-
work. Here we consider effective fingerprints, denoted by r. The effective fingerprint is
the result of applying the appropriate mask over the original fingerprint f . We use the
following parameters: L is the number of bits in each fingerprint (2048 in our setting).
T refers to the number of samples taken from each paper sheet in a dataset (e.g., in
the our benchmark dataset T = 10). N is the total number of paper sheets involved in
a dataset (e.g., in the our benchmark dataset N = 100). We use the following indices
accordingly: n denotes the paper sheet number within different sheets, t represents
the sample number within the samples from the same paper sheet, and l shows l-th
bit in the effective fingerprint.
4.2.1. Space Dimension. This dimension is concerned with bit variations with respect
to the locations of the bits in fingerprints. Metrics in this dimension evaluate the over-
all inter-sheet behaviour of fingerprints.
— Uniformity: This metric shows how uniform 0s and 1s are in a fingerprint. The ideal
value for this metric is 0.5. Uniformity of the fingerprint from the t-th sample and
n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
Uniformity(n, t) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
rn,t,l (8)
— Randomness: This metric indicates the average randomness of the bits in the fin-
gerprints generated from several acquisitions from a sheet. The ideal value for this
metric is 1. Randomness of the fingerprint bits generated from the n-th sheet is cal-
culated as follows:
Randomness(n) = −log2max(pn, 1− pn), (9)
where pn =
1
TL
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
rn,t,l
4.2.2. Time Dimension. This dimension is concerned with fingerprint variations within
multiple samples. Metrics in this dimension evaluate the overall intra-sheet persis-
tence of fingerprints within multiple samples.
— Reliability: This metric shows how consistently fingerprints are reproduced by the
same sheet. The ideal value for this metric is 1. Reliability of the fingerprints gener-
ated from the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
Reliability(n) = 1− 2
T (T − 1)L
T−1∑
t1=1
T∑
t2=t1+1
L∑
l=1
(rn,t1,l ⊕ rn,t2,l) (10)
— Steadiness: This metric indicates the bias of individual fingerprint bits on average for
a sheet. The ideal value for this metric is 1. Steadiness of the fingerprints generated
from the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
Steadiness(n) = 1 +
1
L
L∑
l=1
log2max(pn,l, 1− pn,l) (11)
where pn,l =
1
T
T∑
t=1
rn,t,l
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(a) Transmission (b) Reflection
Fig. 5: Capturing a photo, in case of (a) transmission, and (b) reflection, using the
same digital camera and light source.
4.2.3. Device Dimension. This dimension is concerned with fingerprint variations be-
tween multiple sheets. Metrics in this dimension evaluate the overall inter-sheet dis-
tinguishability of fingerprints.
— Uniqueness: This metric represents how distinguishable a sheet is within a group of
sheets. The ideal value for this metric is 0.5. Uniqueness of the fingerprints generated
from the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
Uniqueness(n) =
1
T 2L(N − 1) ·
T∑
t=1
N∑
n′=1
n′ 6=n
T∑
t′=1
L∑
l=1
(rn,t,l ⊕ rn′,t′,l) (12)
— Bit-Aliasing: This metric indicates how likely different sheets are to produce identical
fingerprint bits. The ideal value for this metric is 0.5. Bit-aliasing of the l-th bit of
the fingerprints generated from a dataset is calculated as follows:
Bit-Aliasing(l) =
1
NT
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
rn,t,l (13)
4.3. Reflection vs. Transmission
As discussed before, the main motivation of our work is to capture paper textural
patterns and efficiently extract unique paper fingerprints from such patterns using
an off-the-shelf camera. By contract, previous works [Buchanan et al. 2005; Clarkson
et al. 2009; Sharma et al. 2011] extract paper fingerprints from the paper surface. Our
hypothesis is that textural patterns revealed by the transmissive light contain richer
features than the paper surface shown by the reflective light. To verify this hypothesis,
we set up an experiment to investigate the difference between the two patterns.
We set up the paper photographing in two settings: one with the light source on
the same side of the paper and the other with the light source on the opposite side of
the paper (see Figure 5). In the former, we put an opaque object behind the paper, so
only the paper surface is photographed based on the reflective light. We selected 10
common A4 (210×297 mm) paper sheets with grammage 80 g/m2. We took 10 photos
of each sheet in each of the two settings. We used a common overhead projector as
our light source. We tried to reduce the effect of any ambient light by setting our data
collection environment in a dark room. This data collection resulted in two datasets:
a 100-sample dataset (10 sheets with 10 samples for each sheet) for surface measure-
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Fig. 6: Hamming distance distributions for surface and texture.
ments, and a 100-sample dataset (10 sheets with 10 sample for each sheet) for textural
measurements.
After the data collection, we performed our fingerprint extraction algorithm (as dis-
cussed in Section 3) for both datasets. Figure 6 shows the Hamming distance distri-
butions for the two cases. Each diagram depicts four distributions: for each case i.e.,
surface and texture, there is one curve, concentrated around lower values of Hamming
distance, showing the distribution of Hamming distance between pairs of fingerprints
of the same paper sheet, and a second curve, concentrated around a Hamming dis-
tance value of about 0.5, showing the distribution of Hamming distance between pairs
of fingerprints of different paper sheets.
Ideally, for effective fingerprint recognition, we want the “same-group” and
“different-group” distributions to be as separate as possible, since then we can eas-
ily decide on a threshold and consider any two fingerprints with a Hamming distance
below that threshold to belong to the same paper sheet, and consider any two fin-
gerprints with a Hamming distance above that threshold to belong to different paper
sheets.
As can be seen in Figure 6, the two distributions, i.e., “same-group” and “different-
group”, are well-separated in the case of texture, but less so in the case of surface. In
fact, in the case of texture, the minimum Hamming distance for different comparisons
is 0.46 and the maximum Hamming distance for similar comparisons is 0.27, which
shows that there is no overlap between the two distributions. However, in the case
of surface, the minimum Hamming distance for different comparisons is 0.44 and the
maximum Hamming distance for similar comparisons is 0.48, which shows that there
is some overlap between the two distributions, and hence false negative or false pos-
itive decisions are inevitable in this case. Indeed, decidability for the case of texture
is around 20, but for the case of surface it is around 6. Furthermore, the number of
degrees of freedom provided by the texture is slightly higher than that provided by the
surface. These results support our hypothesis that the textural measurements through
transmissive light contain more distinctive features than surface measurements based
on reflective light, and hence can be used as a more reliable source for paper finger-
printing.
We should stress that the hypothesis is tested using a specific image capturing con-
dition in which only one snapshot is taken. One should not directly compare the results
with Clarkson et al.’s 3D method [Clarkson et al. 2009], which is carried out in a dif-
ferent test condition and involves taking four scans from four different angles on the
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paper surface. However, we believe a method that is based on taking a single snapshot
is easier and quicker than those that require multiple measurements.
4.4. Determining Gabor Scale & Orientation
As discussed, Gabor filter can be configured with different scales and orientations. To
find out the appropriate combination of scales and orientation for our method, we set
up an initial experiment. We collected a dataset including two sub-datasets: the first
one includes 20 samples from one paper sheet; the second one includes one sample
from each of 20 paper sheets. These two sub-datasets constitute our same-group and
different-group data, respectively. We applied Gabor filter for 8 orientations, indexed
from 1 to 8, representing angles 0, pi8 ,
pi
4 ,
3pi
8 ,
pi
2 ,
5pi
8 ,
3pi
4 , and
7pi
8 . Considering fmax = 0.25,
we also considered multiple scales, indexed by integer values starting from scale 1. We
used fixed values of η = γ =
√
2 and σ = 1.
Ideally, we would want the different-group distribution to be centred around 0.5 or
a mean very close to 0.5. Our experiments show that for scales greater than 7, the
mean of the different-group distribution falls below 0.45, which indicates undesirable
bias on the binomial distributions (i.e., tossing a coin is no longer random in the a
Bernoulli trial [Daugman 2003]). Therefore, in the following we limit the scope of our
investigation to scales from 1 to 7.
Our calculations show that as the scale increases, the decidability of the distri-
butions increases, but at the same time the number of the degrees of freedom the
different-group distribution provides decreases. This is because the scale relates to the
spatial frequency components of the Gabor filer – the smaller the scale is, the more
detailed the feature extraction is. When the scale is one, the finest detail of the paper
texture is extracted, which leads to high degrees of freedom in the generated finger-
print. However, at this scale, the image processing is extremely sensitive to noise,
which reduces the separation between the same-group and different-group histograms
of Hamming distances. Increasing the scale results in a zooming-out effect. More cor-
relations between bits are introduced, which reduces the degrees of freedom. But on
the other hand, the feature extraction is more tolerant of noise. As a result, the same-
paper and different-paper characteristics become more distinctive, which leads to a
higher decidability.
The results for decidability and degrees of freedom for orientations 1 to 8 and scales
1 to 7 are shown in Figures 7(a) and 7(b), respectively. Both figures also include a
spline interpolation of average values of different orientation results within each scale
to highlight the dominant trends. Therefore, there is an evident trade-off in choosing
the scale and orientation. Too low a scale would not provide an acceptable decidabil-
ity, while too high a scale would not provide a reasonable degree of freedom. Through
experiments, we find that the combination of scale 5 and orientation 7 provides a good
trade-off between decidability and degrees of freedom. As we will explain later, this
combination provides nearly perfect recognition rates. In the rest of the paper, we re-
port all our findings based on this specific configuration of Gabor filter.
4.5. The Benchmark Dataset
Our main dataset on which we report our evaluations is a set of 1000 samples collected
by taking 10 photos of each of 100 different paper sheets to provide a good diversity.
We use typical office paper sheets of size A4 (210mm × 297mm) with grammage of
80 g/m2. All the sheets were from the same pack with the same brand. In all of the
photos, camera settings including aperture and exposure time were kept constant. We
tried to keep the paper sheets visually aligned for the different samples, and conducted
separate experiments to evaluate the robustness of our algorithm against rotations
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Fig. 7: Results of (a) decidability and (b) degrees of freedom in scales 1 to 7 and orien-
tations 1 to 8.
(which we discuss in Section 5). We refer to the main dataset collected here under
relatively stable conditions as the benchmark dataset.
4.6. Experiment Results
In the following, we present the results of our experiments reporting the metrics in-
troduced in Section 4.2. We also present the timing measurements for our method
and provide a short discussion on its practicality. We provide comparison with existing
work whenever the relevant metrics are reported in the literature.
Biometric metrics. We calculated the Hamming distance for all comparisons, con-
sisting of same-group comparisons and different-group comparisons. There are a total
of
(
1000
2
)
= 499, 500 comparisons, of which 100 · ( 102 ) = 4, 500 are same-group compar-
isons and 1000×9902 = 495, 000 are different-group comparisons. In Figure 8 we show
the distributions for the same-group and different-group Hamming distance values.
Clearly, the two distributions are well-separated, which shows the effectiveness of our
paper fingerprinting method. Indeed, the maximum same-group Hamming distance is
0.24, whereas the minimum different-group Hamming distance is 0.42, which shows
that there is no overlap between the two distributions. Hence, any threshold between
the above values would give us FAR and FRR of zero. As an example, we can choose
the threshold to be 0.4, but this is adjustable. Detailed error rate performance will be
reported in Section 6.2.
Decidability for the dataset is d′ ≈ 21, which compares favourably to d′ ≈ 14 for
iris recognition in the ideal condition [Daugman 2003]. The number of degrees of free-
dom is calculated based on Equation 7 as N = 807, which means the entropy of the
extracted fingerprints is 807 bits out of a total of 2048 bits. As compared to the 249
degrees of freedom for iris (which has the same size of 2048 bits), the fingerprint in
our case is more unique and contains less redundancy. Figure 9 shows the histogram
of same-group Hamming distance values on the left and the distribution of different-
group Hamming distance values on the right. The diagram on the right also includes
a binomial distribution curve with degrees of freedom N = 807, mean µ = 0.495, and
standard deviation σ = 0.018. Evidently, the different-group distribution closely follows
the binomial distribution.
PUF evaluations results. The PUF metrics results on the benchmark dataset
are shown in Table II under the column labelled “Benchmark Dataset”. It can be seen
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:16
0 5 · 10−2 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.60
2 · 10−2
8 · 10−2
0.1
Fractional Hamming Distance
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
Same Group
Diff. Group
Fig. 8: Hamming distance distributions in the benchmark dataset.
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Fig. 9: Histograms of Hamming distances in the benchmark dataset.
that in all metrics our dataset performed close to ideal values. For comparison, we also
included in Table II the PUF metrics for two typical PUFs: Arbiter PUF, and Ring
Oscillator PUF [Maiti et al. 2013]. This shows that our method provides fingerprints
with good uniformity, randomness, reliability, steadiness, uniqueness, and bit-aliasing.
Timing Results & Usability. Our paper fingerprinting method takes 1.30 seconds
on average to prepare the photo, analyse the texture, and generate the fingerprint on
a PC. This is reasonably fast. This is in contrast with the method in [Clarkson et al.
2009], which requires four scans in different directions and then constructing a 3D
surface model. Although the authors of [Clarkson et al. 2009] do not report timing
measurements for their fingerprinting method, 3D modeling is generally considered a
computationally expensive task [Brown et al. 2008].
The whole process of paper fingerprinting in our method is automatized and only
requires a user to place the sheet of paper on the flat surface of the overhead projector
and click a button to take a photo by a fixed camera. We note that this is only a proof-
of-concept prototype to demonstrate the feasibility of extracting the fingerprint based
on the textural patterns. One may improve the prototype in a practical application by
tighter integration of various equipment components. For example, at a border control,
when the official swipes a page in the passenger’s passport through a slot, the slot may
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Table I: False recognition rates of all datasets considering a fractional HD threshold of
0.4
Rate Ideal Benchmark Rotated Crumpled Scribbled Soaked Heated Mixed
Value Dataset Light
FAR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FRR 0% 0% 0.32% 3.2% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Table II: PUF metrics for all datasets and two typical PUFs
PUF Ideal Arbiter PUF (APUF) Ring Oscillator PUF Benchmark
Metrics Value [Maiti et al. 2013] [Maiti et al. 2013] Dataset
Average Uniformity 0.5 0.556 0.505 0.466
Average Randomness 1.0 0.846 0.968 0.907
Average Reliability 1.0 0.997 0.991 0.945
Average Steadiness 1.0 0.984 0.985 0.938
Average Uniqueness 0.5 0.072 0.472 0.465
Average Bit Aliasing 0.5 0.195 0.505 0.466
Table III: Impact of Robustness Experiments on PUF metrics
PUF Ideal Benchmark Rotated Crumpled Scribbled Soaked Heated Mixed
Metrics Value Dataset Light
Average Uniformity 0.5 0.466 0.466 0.463 0.454 0.460 0.460 0.466
Average Randomness 1.0 0.907 0.906 0.896 0.873 0.877 0.890 0.907
Average Reliability 1.0 0.945 0.877 0.852 0.856 0.750 0.882 0.905
Average Steadiness 1.0 0.938 0.839 0.528 0.870 0.554 0.554 0.874
Average Uniqueness 0.5 0.465 0.465 0.470 0.468 0.463 0.461 0.465
Average Bit Aliasing 0.5 0.466 0.466 0.463 0.454 0.460 0.460 0.466
have the embedded light source on one side and a camera on the other side. When the
page is in the slot, a unique fingerprint can be extracted. The fingerprinting area and
orientation will be relatively fixed as it is determined by the dimensions of the slot.
By comparing the extracted fingerprint with a reference sample (e.g., stored in the
back-end system), the computer program can quickly determine if the passport page
is genuine. In Section 6, we will explain more on how to utilizing the unique paper
fingerprint in authentication protocols.
5. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATIONS
In this section we evaluate our method’s robustness in non-ideal circumstances. First,
we consider the robustness of our method against misalignment, i.e., in cases where
the rectangular box is not aligned to the photo frame. Then, we consider the robustness
of our method against paper being roughly handled in the following cases: the paper
sheet is crumpled, some scribbling is done in the rectangular box, the sheet is soaked in
water and dried afterwards, and the sheet is ironed after soaking and partially burnt.
Finally, we consider the effect of using an alternative light source. In the following, we
give the details of each experiment and provide the biometric and PUF metrics in each
of the cases.
5.1. Impact of Non-Ideal Data Collection
Photo Rotation. The orientation of the photo is the angle between the rectangular
box and the photo frame. A rotated photo is shown in Figure 10(b). The maximum
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(a) Benchmark (b) Rotated (c) Crumpled (d) Scribbled
Fig. 10: The captured photo under near-ideal and non-ideal situations.
rotation we can have such that the box is still fully captured within the boundary of
the photo frame is around 12◦. We selected 10 paper sheets and collected 5 samples in
each angle within {−12◦,−11◦, . . . , 0◦, . . . , ,+11◦,+12◦}. This gives us 125 samples per
sheet, 1250 samples in total.
Figure 11 shows the Hamming distance distributions. As expected, the same-group
and different-group distributions get slightly closer to each other in comparison with
the benchmark dataset. However, decidability, although reduced, is still a healthy d′ ≈
8. This shows that our image processing method is somewhat sensitive to the image
rotation. We believe there is still room to improve the robustness against rotation,
however with the current method and based on a threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0%,
and the FRR is less than 1%. These values can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table II. The experiment dataset still has good
uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing, but there is a slight drop in reliability, steadi-
ness, and uniqueness compared to the benchmark dataset.
The experiment shows that our method is robust against non-ideal data collec-
tion in terms of rotation. In comparison, Clarkson et al. do not report robustness
against rotation and in fact require “precise alignment of each surface point across
all scans” [Clarkson et al. 2009].
5.2. Impact of Non-Ideal Paper Handling
In this section we investigate the robustness of our method against rough handling
of paper sheet including crumpling, scribbling, soaking, and heating. For each of the
experiments in this section, a set of 10 paper sheets are selected. For each paper sheet,
5 samples were taken before and 5 samples after the non-ideal handling of the pa-
per sheet, adding up to a total of 100 samples per experiment. The same-group and
different-group distributions under the test conditions of crumpling, scribbling, soak-
ing and heating are shown in Figure 11. For readability, we opt to show fitted curves
for the distributions. These curves are non-parametric fits with a threshold bandwidth
of 0.02 (i.e., the distributions are merely smoothed).
Crumpling. In this experiment, we crumpled our paper sheets to the extent that
the borders of the rectangular box were visibly distorted. We did not try to smooth out
the sheet surface after crumpling. An example of a photo taken from a crumpled paper
sheet can be seen in Figure 10(c).
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in Figure 11. Decidability
is d′ ≈ 4.6. Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0%, and the FRR is 3.2%.
These values can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table III. The experiment dataset still has good
uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing, but there is a slight drop in reliability and
uniqueness and a bigger drop in steadiness compared to the benchmark dataset.
Scribbling. In this experiment, we drew random patterns with a black pen over all
samples such that each pattern covers around 5% of the box area. An example of such
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scribbling can be seen in Figure 10(d). Our preprocessing phase successfully identifies
the scribbled area in the mask in all samples.
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in Figure 11. The maxi-
mum same-group Hamming distance is 0.25 and the minimum different-group Ham-
ming distance is 0.45. The distributions are well-separated. Decidability is d′ ≈ 9.7.
Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0%, and the FRR is also 0%. These
values can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table III. The experiment dataset still has good
uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing, but there is a slight drop in reliability, steadi-
ness, and uniqueness compared to the benchmark dataset.
Soaking. In this experiment, we submerged the paper sheets in tap water for
around 20 seconds. Then, we let them dry naturally and collected the after-soaking
samples from the dried sheets.
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in Figure 11. The maxi-
mum same-group Hamming distance is 0.36 and the minimum different-group Ham-
ming distance is 0.44. The distributions are well-separated. Decidability is d′ ≈ 6.8.
Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0%, and the FRR is also 0%. These
values can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table III. The experiment dataset still has good
uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing, but there is a slight drop in reliability and
uniqueness and a bigger drop in steadiness compared to the benchmark dataset.
Heating. In this experiment, we ironed all the papers from the soaking experiment
for at least 20 seconds, to the extent that in some cases there was a clearly visible
colour change (to light brown) and the paper was partly burnt.
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in Figure 11. The maxi-
mum same-group Hamming distance is 0.30 and the minimum different-group Ham-
ming distance is 0.44. The distributions are well-separated. Decidability is d′ ≈ 8.6.
Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0%, and the FRR is also 0%. These
values can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table III. The experiment dataset still has good
uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing, but there is a slight drop in reliability and
uniqueness and a bigger drop in steadiness compared to the benchmark dataset.
Summary. Taking all the above results into consideration, we can see that our
method shows the strongest robustness against scribbling. Both the biometric and
PUF measures support this observation. The Hamming distance distributions are
well-separated and all PUF metrics remain close to ideal values. Fingerprinting is
also fairly robust against rotation, soaking, and heating. There is no or negligible false
rejection rates and all PUF metrics possibly except for steadiness remain close to ideal
values. Crumpling seems to pose the strongest challenge to robustness. Although false
rejection rate is 3.2% and steadiness is not ideal, the method is still able to provide 0%
false acceptance rate and healthy PUF metrics otherwise.
Focusing on biometric metrics, authentication rates remain perfect or nearly perfect
under all robustness tests. This means our method provides a promising candidate for
paper-based document authentication in practice which is able to cope with non-ideal
sample collection and rough handling.
Focusing on PUF metrics, space and device dimension metrics stay close to ideal
values under all tests, which indicates that the quality of fingerprint bits are still
good and the sheets remain clearly distinguishable from one another. Time dimension
metrics remain close to ideal values for rotation and scribbling, but steadiness and
in some cases reliability drops as a result of crumpling, soaking, or heating. This is
expected as crumpling, soaking, and heating physically change the paper sheets.
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(a) Fitted distributions under rotation.
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(b) Fitted distributions under non-ideal paper han-
dling.
Fig. 11: The Hamming distance distributions for robustness experiments.
5.3. Impact of a Different Light Source
The light source should be bright enough to reveal the texture patterns in a paper
sheet. In the proof-of-concept experiments, we used an overhead projector, however,
the equipment is relatively bulky and expensive. Questions remain if there are cheaper
ways to obtain the light source and if the results are robust against using a different
light source. To investigate this, we purchased a commodity light box (tracing pad)
from Amazon for £49.99 (see Figure 4(c)). Then, we used the same paper sheets as in
the benchmark dataset–excluding 10 paper sheets that were used in other robustness
tests–to collect a new set of samples using the new light source. We followed the same
data collection procedure as before.
Due to the difference in the light intensity, the camera setting needs to be adjusted.
In particular, we altered the exposure time to 1/500 seconds and F-stop to f/5. These
values were automatically recommended by the camera, so we simply accepted them.
The exposure time is the duration that the shutter takes to capture a photo and F-
Stop is the radius of the lens diaphragm; both of them are inspired by the way human
eyes react to a light source. These modifications in the camera setting were necessary
because of the change in the intensity of the light source. The final dataset included
900 captured images, 10 samples from each paper sheet.
Figure 12(a) shows the Hamming distance distributions using the light box. The
same-group and different-group distributions are well-separated from each other. Ap-
plying the biometric metrics, our analysis shows the decidability d′ ≈ 24 and the num-
ber of the degrees of freedom DoF ≈ 846, both slightly higher than those obtained with
the overhead projector. Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR and FRR are still 0%.
These values can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table III. The new experiment results show that
all PUF metrics are comparable to those obtained earlier in the benchmark dataset.
Figure 12(b) shows the Hamming distance distribution by combining the light box
and overhead projector datasets. The number of the degrees of freedom is roughly
unchanged at DoF ≈ 836. However, the same-group data become noisier because of
mixing two different light sources. The decidability drops to 10. Despite of the mix of
different light sources, the same-group and different-group histograms are still clearly
separated. The maximum Hamming distance for the same-group samples is 0.31 while
the minimum Hamming distance of the different-group is 0.42.
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Fig. 12: Distributions of HDs for the light box experiment.
The experiment shows that our method is robust against different light sources, as
long as the camera settings are set correctly.
6. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we explain authentication protocols based on the extracted paper fin-
gerprint, and discuss their practical performance.
6.1. Trust assumptions
Our fingerprinting technique may be applied in a range of applications, e.g., to prevent
counterfeiting of paper currency, passports, certificates, contracts and official receipts.
The secure use of the fingerprint is based on two assumptions. Both assumptions are
generally required in biometrics and physical unclonable functions (PUF) applications.
The first assumption is physical “unclonability”. We assume it is infeasible to phys-
ically clone a paper sheet with the same paper texture. The paper texture is formed
from randomly interleaved wooden particles, as a naturally occurring outcome of the
paper manufacturing process. This process can not be precisely controlled. Repeating
exactly the same process to produce the same paper texture is considered to be pro-
hibitively expensive, if not impossible [Pappu 2001].
The second assumption is about a trustworthy measuring process. Take the human
fingerprint authentication as an example. If an attacker is able to deceive the scan-
ner by presenting a gummy finger, the security guarantee based on the “unclonability”
assumption will be lost. In any biometric or PUF application, it is important to en-
sure that the measurement is performed on a real object and a fresh measurement
is acquired. In practice, this is often realized through the human supervision in the
process or by using specialized equipment (e.g., iris scanners with embedded liveness
test). In the case of paper documents, visual inspection can be applied to check that
they are made of paper and the paper fiber texture has not been tampered with. An at-
tacker may try to interfere with the texture measurement by printing patterns on the
paper surface. Using today’s commodity printers, it seems unlikely that an attacker is
able to print patterns that are precise at the pixel level under the microscopic view of
a high-resolution camera (since the print head cannot be precisely controlled and each
printed dot tends to be in a scattered pattern due to imperfection of the printing pro-
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cess; see [Clarkson et al. 2009]). However, when the measurement is not guaranteed
to be coming from real paper texture, the acquisition process is no longer trustwor-
thy – an attacker can at least deny the authentication by printing random patterns
with strong contrast on the paper. This threat can be addressed by checking that the
intended area for authentication is free from overprinting.
6.2. Comparison based on Hamming distance
A straightforward application of authenticating a paper fingerprint is based on com-
paring the Hamming distance between two fingerprints. It consists of two phases. In
the first phase, a paper fingerprint, along with a mask, is extracted from the textu-
ral patterns as the template and stored in a database. In the second phase, given a
provided paper sheet, the same fingerprinting algorithm is followed to output a new
fingerprint and a mask. Depending on the applications, there are two types of authen-
tication modes: verification or recognition.
Verification works on a one-to-one comparison. This assumes the reference to the
stored template is known (as it is often provided by the authenticating subject). Hence,
once the template is retrieved, it is a straightforward comparison between two finger-
prints based on their Hamming distance as explained in Equation 5. This comparison
determines if the presented paper sheet is the same as the one registered earlier.
By contrast, recognition works on a one-to-many comparison. In this case, the refer-
ence to the pre-stored template is unknown. Hence, the program searches throughout
the database, comparing the extracted fingerprint exhaustively with each of the stored
templates in order identify a match where the Hamming distance is sufficiently small.
This is the same as how iris recognition works.
In terms of accuracy, the recognition mode is far more demanding than the verifi-
cation mode, because the false accept rate accumulates with the size of the database.
As an illustration, let P1 be the false acceptance rate for one-to-one matching in the
verification mode. Assume P1 is very small. Let Pn be the false acceptance rate in the
recognition mode for a database of n records.
Pn = 1− (1− P1)n
≈ n · P1
The above equation shows that the accumulative false acceptance rate in the one-to-
many mode increases roughly linearly with the size of the database [Daugman 2003].
Hence, for the one-to-many matching to work accurately, the false acceptance rate for
the one-to-one comparison must be extremely small.
For the paper fingerprints extracted in our proposal, they have sufficient entropy to
support precise recognition even for an extremely large database. Based on the bino-
mial distributions with 807 degrees of freedom, the false acceptance rates for compar-
ing two paper fingerprints are listed in Table IV. If we opt to maintain Pn < 10−6 for
the recognition mode as stated in [Daugman 2003], our algorithm can easily support
searching a database of 3 quintillions (3 × 1018) fingerprints at a threshold of 0.32. By
comparison, for the same accuracy (< 10−6) and the same threshold (0.32), iris recog-
nition can only support a database of only 26 iris codes. (As stated in [Daugman 2003],
for a database of a million iris codes, the threshold needs to be adjusted downwards to
below 0.27 to keep the false accept rate under 10−6). Because of the much higher de-
grees of freedom of paper fingerprints, they can be used for the recognition application
at a much larger scale than the iris biometric.
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Table IV: False Acceptance Rate (FAR) for comparing two fingerprints
HD Threshold False acceptance rate
0.30 7.1× 10−31
0.31 5.3× 10−28
0.32 2.7× 10−25
0.33 1.0× 10−22
0.34 2.5× 10−20
0.35 4.5× 10−18
0.36 5.8× 10−16
0.37 5.2× 10−14
0.38 3.3× 10−12
0.39 1.5× 10−10
0.40 5.2× 10−9
6.3. Paper fingerprint encryption
One limitation with the previous verification/recognition method is that the template
is stored in plaintext in the database. When the plaintext template is revealed, it may
cause degradation of security. This is especially the case with biometrics, since bio-
metric data is considered private to each individual. Paper fingerprints are essentially
“biometrics” of paper. One established technique in biometrics is through biometric
encryption. Similarly, we can apply the similar technique to realize fingerprint encryp-
tion. We will present one concrete construction and show that because paper finger-
prints have much higher entropy than even the most accurate biometric in use (iris),
the corresponding encryption scheme is able to provide much higher security assur-
ance as well.
Our construction is based on Hao et al.’s scheme [Hao et al. 2006]. This work is
inspired by Juels et al. [Juels and Wattenberg 1999] and has been successfully imple-
mented in iris recognition. It comprises two phases. In phase one, the program extracts
a paper fingerprint from the paper texture as a reference fa. It then generates a ran-
dom key k (140 bits), and expands the key to a pseudo fingerprint fp = ErrorCC(k)
(a 2048-bit codeword) where ErrorCC is an error-correction encoding scheme based
on Hadamard-Reed-Solomon. Our analysis shows there is a combination of block and
random errors in our fingerprints; therefore, we selected a concatenated approach. The
choice of 140 bits k is a balance between security (minimum 128 bit security for the
secret key) and performance, as well as considering the special parametric require-
ments for a concatenated code scheme to work at a desired level of error correction.
Subsequently, the scheme computes an encrypted fingerprint r = fa ⊕ fp. In addition,
the program computes h = H(k) where H is a secure one-way hash function. Finally,
the program stores r and h in the database. Alternatively, r and h can be stored in a
2-D barcode printed on paper. The advantage of doing so is to allow authentication in
the off-line mode. In this case, an additional digital signature s should be included to
prove the authenticity of data in the barcode. At this stage, the original template fa
and the random key k can be safely deleted. The registration process is summarized in
Algorithm 1. In Figure 13, we show a QR code generated from the registration phase
in our prototype implementation.
The second phase is authentication. In this phase, data from the 2-D barcode is first
read and the digital signature verified. A paper fingerprint fs is extracted from the
provided paper sheet. The program then computes:
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:24
Fig. 13: Generated QR Code in the authentication protocol. This QR code contains the
encrypted fingerprint, H(k) and a digital signature for both items.
fs ⊕ r = fs ⊕ (fa ⊕ ErrorCC(k))
= (fs ⊕ fa)⊕ ErrorCC(k)
= e⊕ ErrorCC(k)
In the above equation, e can be regarded as “noise” added to the codeword
ErrorCC(k). As we explained earlier, the Hamming distances between same-paper
fingerprints typically range from 0 to 0.25. In the definition of the Hadamard-Reed-
Solomon code, we follow the same coding parameters as in [Hao et al. 2006]. The re-
sultant error correction code is capable of correcting up to 27% error bits in a 2048-bit
codeword. Hence, by running the Hadamard-Reed-Solomon decoding scheme, the error
vector e can be effectively removed, and the original k can be recovered error-free. The
correctness of the decoding process can be verified by comparing the obtained k against
the retrieved H(k). This authentication process is summarized in Algorithm 2.
ALGORITHM 1: Registration
Generate Random key k ;
Generate Reference Paper Fingerprint fa;
Expand key k to Pseudo Fingerprint fp ;
Calculate r = fa ⊕ fp ;
Calculate h = H(k) ;
Calculate Digital Signature s = Sig(r, h) ;
Store (r, h, s) in a 2-D barcode ;
ALGORITHM 2: Verification
Read r, h = H(k) and s = Sig(r, h) ;
if Signature Verification Success then
Generate Paper Fingerprint fs ;
Calculate f ′ = fs ⊕ r ;
Acquire k′ by decoding f ′ ;
Calculate H(k′) ;
if H(k′)==H(k) then
Success ;
else
Failure ;
else
Failure ;
The key feature of the above “fingerprint encryption” scheme is that it preserves the
secrecy of the fingerprint template since it forms the basis for authentication. In this
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way, no fingerprint template is stored in the plain form. As an example for comparison,
without using this encryption scheme, the barcode would contain the plain fingerprint
template. Once in the line of sight to an attacker, the barcode can be trivially read
say by using a video camera, hence the template will be stolen. With the encryption
scheme applied, the attacker would need physical access to the paper in order to take
a close-up snapshot of the fiber textures with a bright light source shining underneath
the paper. This makes the attack significantly more difficult to carry out in practice
without the user noticing it.
Hence, the application of privacy preserving protocol for authentication avoids stor-
ing the texture structure in the plain text form. The goal here is to protect the paper
texture from an attacker who does not have physical access to the paper sheet itself.
An adversary who has access to the barcode printed on the paper can read all data
including an encrypted fingerprint r = fa ⊕ ErrorCC(k). One potential problem as
highlighted in [Hao et al. 2006] is that if the fingerprint fa contains significant cor-
relations between bits, r may leak information about the fingerprint. The authors of
[Hao et al. 2006] use the iris code as an example to illustrate that due to a high level of
redundancy in iris codes, the encrypted iris code only has a lower-bound security of 44
bits. However, 44 bits security is not sufficient to satisfy high security requirements.
As a result, the encrypted iris code (also called the secure sketch in the PUF literature)
should not be published as public data; instead, it should be stored in a personal token
as suggested in [Hao et al. 2006].
The above limitation with the iris codes does not apply in our case. Although the pa-
per fingerprint defined in our work has the same size as an iris code (2048 bits), it has
much higher degrees of freedom (807 as compared to 249). Following the same sphere-
packing bound as defined in [Hao et al. 2006], we estimate the lower-bound security
for the encrypted fingerprints as follows. Here, the lower-bound security refers to the
minimum efforts required for a successful brute-force attack, under the assumption
that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the correlations within the document pa-
per sheet’s fingerprint, hence the uncertainty (or entropy) about the fingerprint is 807
bits instead 2048 bits. The error correction capability for the Hadamard-Reed-Solomon
code allows correcting up to 27% error bits. So in principle the attacker only needs to
guess a fingerprint that is within the Hamming distance of 807× 0.27 ≈ 218 bits to the
correct fingerprint. Following the estimation method in [Hao et al. 2006], based on the
sphere-packing bound [Hamming 1950], the minimum guess effort with z = 807 and
w = 218 is calculated with the following equation:
G ≥ 2
z∑w
i=0
(
z
i
) = 2133 (14)
The above bound states that an attacker with full knowledge about fingerprint cor-
relations and the error correction process would need at least 2133 attempts in order to
uncover the original fingerprint used in the registration and the random key k. This
133-bit security is much higher than the 44-bit security reported in [Hao et al. 2006],
and is sufficient for almost all practical applications. This is possible because the pa-
per textural patterns are far more distinctive than iris textural patterns. In iris, there
exist substantial correlations along the radial structures [Daugman 2003]. The same
phenomenon does not exist in paper texture, which explains the higher degrees of free-
dom in our case. This high level of security makes it possible to simply store the (r, h, s)
values on a barcode instead of in a secure database. Alternatively, they may be stored
in an RFID chip, and retrieved wirelessly during the verification phrase (e.g., in an
e-passport application).
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Fig. 14: Histogram of Hamming distances between raw fingerprints without masks.
We evaluate the performance of this authentication scheme based on the benchmark
database and are able to report perfect error rates: 0% FRR and 0% FAR. Note that this
performance evaluation is slightly different from the direct comparison between two
fingerprints based on their Hamming distance. The authentication is successful, only if
the Hadamard-Reed-Solomon code is able to correct the errors (introduced by the XOR
between two fingerprints) added to the error correction codeword, and hence recover
the same random k (verified again H(k)). The authentication protocol can only accom-
modate raw fingerprints, without masks (see [Hao et al. 2006]). Figure 14 shows the
histogram of Hamming distance between raw fingerprints without masks. The same-
paper and different-paper distributions are well-separated. The error correct code we
implemented corrects errors up to 27%. This is sufficient to correct errors for all same-
paper fingerprints, yet not sufficient for different-paper fingerprints. This explains the
0% FRR and 0% FAR that we obtain (see Figure 14).
7. RELATED WORK
In the introduction (Section 1), we highlight three prominent works in the field (Nature
2005, IEEE S&P 2009, CCS 2011), which have inspired our work. In this section, we
conduct a more comprehensive review of the related work.
Special paper. Some researchers proposed to fingerprint paper by embedding spe-
cial materials. Bauder [Bauder 1983] was the first to propose the idea of a certificate of
authenticity (COA), which is a collection of fibers randomly positioned in an object and
permanently fixed by using transparent gluing material. Once an end-point of a fiber
is exposed to light, the other end is illuminated, and as a whole this creates unique
illuminated patterns, which can be captured by a light detector. The main intended
application is to use COA for banknotes to ensure authenticity. Kirovski [Kirovski
2004] followed up Bauder’s work and proposed to combine the captured illuminated
patterns with arbitrary text, signed with the private key of the banknote issuer. The
signature is then encoded as a barcode and printed on the banknote. Chen et al. [Chen
et al. 2005] proposed an improved scanner to achieve automated verification of fiber-
based COAs. In a similar work, Bulens et al. [Bulens et al. 2010] proposed to embed
different material–ultra-violet fibers–into the paper mixture, and use a UV scanner
to obtain a unique fingerprint. The authors report that the derived fingerprints have
72-bit entropy.
Unmodified Paper and using laser. One limitation with all the works men-
tioned above is that they require modifying the paper manufacturing process. Other
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researchers investigate fingerprinting techniques that can work with ordinary paper
without altering the manufacturing process at all. One prominent work along this line
of research is due to Buchanan et al. [Buchanan et al. 2005] published in Nature 2005.
The researchers proposed to use a focused laser beam to scan across a sheet of stan-
dard white paper and continuously record the reflected intensity from four different
angles by using four photodetectors. The laser reflection is random, and is determined
by the non-uniform paper surface. Hence, the recorded reflection intensities constitute
a unique fingerprint. Beijnum et al. followed up this research idea in [van Beijnum
et al. 2006]. They formulated a criterion for recognition that limits the false accep-
tance rate (FAR) to 0.1%. Samul et al. [Samsul et al. 2010] presented a similar idea
of shooting a beam of laser onto the surface of the paper. But instead of using pho-
todetectors, they proposed to use a CCD camera to capture the microscopic patterns of
speckles.
Unmodified paper and using light. Laser-based fingerprinting methods have the
limitation that they require special laser equipment. A more cost-effective solution is
to use a commonly available light source. Metois et al. [Me´tois et al. 2002] proposed
custom-built equipment called the “imager”, which consists of a consumer-grade video
module and lens, housed along with an embedded lighting apparatus. The imager pro-
vides a grayscale snapshot of the naturally occurring inhomogeneities of the paper
surface. The snapshot is then processed into a vector of real numbers. The authenti-
cation of paper fingerprints is based on computing the correlation coefficient between
vectors. The equal error rate (EER) is reported to be about 9%.
Clarkson et al. [Clarkson et al. 2009] proposed a similar method to fingerprint a
paper document by using a commodity scanner instead of a specially built “imager”.
Their work was motivated by the observation that when viewed up close, the surface
of a sheet of paper is a tangled mat of wood fibers with a rich three-dimensional tex-
ture that is random and hard to reproduce. Utilizing the embedded light emission, the
researchers use a commodity scanner to scan a paper sheet in four different orienta-
tions. Then a 3-D model is constructed based on these four scans. Furthermore, the
3-D model is compressed into a feature vector through computing Voronoi distribu-
tions in the scanned region. The comparison between two feature vectors is based on
computing the correlation coefficient.
Pham et al. [Pham et al. 2011] adopted the same approach as Clarkson et al. [Clark-
son et al. 2009] by using an EPSON 10000XL scanner at 600 dpi to collect 10 scans
of the paper surface. In particular, they look at the case when text has been printed
over the authentication zone, and propose two methods of pixel inpainting to remove
printed text (or marks) from the authentication zone in order to allow ordinary correla-
tion to be performed. Different from the proposed method of Clarkson et al. [Clarkson
et al. 2009] that compresses the scanned images into a compact feature vector and com-
pares feature vectors based on the correlation coefficient, Pham et al. proposed to use
alpha-masked imaging matching to compare regions of the two paper surface images.
Improvements are demonstrated using the collected data sets in their experiments.
Sharma et al. [Sharma et al. 2011] proposed a different surface-based fingerprint-
ing method. Unlike prior paper fingerprinting techniques [Clarkson et al. 2009; Pham
et al. 2011] that extract fingerprints based on the fiber structure of paper, their method
uses a USB microscope to capture the “surface speckle pattern”, a random bright and
dark region formation at the microscopic level when light falls on the paper surface.
The captured patterns are then processed into a vector of digits, which form the unique
fingerprint. Fingerprints are compared based on the Euclidean distance between the
two vectors.
Beekhof et al. [Beekhof et al. 2008] proposed a fingerprinting method based on mea-
suring random micro-structures of the paper surface. The random micro-structural
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patterns are captured by using a mobile phone camera with macro lens mounted. The
captured image is compressed into a binary feature vector by first hashing the image
values into a list of codewords and then running the decoding process through a ref-
erence list decoding (RLD) technique. Two feature vectors are compared based on the
Hamming distance.
Smith et al. [Smith and Sutherland 1999] proposed another method to capture light
reflections from paper surface. Their method involves printing an 8mm box on paper,
and then taking a snapshot of it. The alignment can then be done automatically by
software based on the printed box, but no details are given in the paper. The authors
apply a “texture hash function” to generate the fingerprints. Fingerprints are authen-
ticated based on computing correlations of the texture hash strings.
Haist and Tiziani [Haist and Tiziani 1998] proposed a method to fingerprint German
banknotes by using a CCD digital camera to take a snapshot of a banknote based on
transmissive light. Then, the snapshot is saved as a JPEG image (2.86 KB), which,
along with a digital signature, is printed on the banknote as a string of 3250 ASCII
characters on an area of 5 cm2. However, no prototype implementation is reported. The
verification is performed by applying the Fourier transform to obtain a feature vector
and computing the correlation between the two vectors. Their idea is the closest to
ours in terms of using transmissive light. However, our work is substantially different
from theirs in several important aspects. First, their work involves testing only three
German Deutsche Mark banknotes while the test data sets used in our work are far
more extensive. Second, they do not perform image pre-processing. As a result, the
positioning and orientation are done manually rather than automatically by a software
algorithm as in our case. Third, they do not carry out image encoding. Consequently,
they need to store a JPEG image (2.86 KB), while we only need to store a compact
fingerprint (256 byte). Fourth, they do not implement their idea in a prototype system.
Hence the feasibility remains uncertain. Most importantly, the Haist-Tiziani paper
does not report any error rate performance, or any entropy analysis, and it does not
perform extensive robustness tests as we have done.
Renesse [van Renesse 1995] proposed a 3-dimensional-structure authentication sys-
tem (3DAS) to authenticate a standard PVC ID-card that has a 3×3 mm2 3DAS-
structure in a transparent window. The 3DAS-structure contains spunlaid fibers that
are thermally bonded at their cross points. In their experiment setup, two infrared
emitting diodes (IREDs) are used as lighting sources to shine on the 3DAS area from
two different angles. This creates two shadow images that are then captured by a two-
dimensional CCD-array. By alternatively switching both IREDs the required parallel
images are produced. Finally, a 20-byte fingerprint is obtained by calculating the cen-
tres of gravity of the captured images. However, Renesse’s paper does not report error
rate performance or perform any entropy analysis. It does not report robustness tests
either.
Summary. We have presented related paper-fingerprinting techniques proposed in
the literature, which have different requirements on paper material, use different
types of illuminating sources and scanning equipment, apply different signal process-
ing techniques and obtain fingerprints of different types and features. Our work ad-
vances the state-of-the-art in this field by presenting the first practical solution that
works with ordinary paper, uses an ordinary lighting source combined with an off-the-
shelf camera, takes only 1.3 seconds to produce a compact fingerprint (256 bytes) from
one snapshot, achieves an ideal 0% FFR, 0% FAR as well as very high entropy (807
bits) in fingerprints, and is demonstrably robust against rotation, crumpling, scrib-
bling, soaking and heating. The near perfect result is attributed to the idea of captur-
ing the paper textural patterns through transmissive light. As detailed in Section 4.2,
using transmissive light reveals richer textural patterns than reflective light and pro-
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:29
duces more reliable features. This explains our superior result as compared to the
earlier surface-based paper fingerprinting methods [Buchanan et al. 2005; Clarkson
et al. 2009; Sharma et al. 2011].
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this research, we propose to fingerprint a paper sheet based on its texture patterns
instead of features on the surface as done by previous work. We show the former con-
tain more distinctive features than the latter with higher decidability in the histogram
of Hamming distance distributions. The experiments are set up to use a commodity
camera to photograph the texture patterns with a light source shining on the other
side of the paper. The rich texture pattens are processed using Gabor wavelets to gen-
erate a compact 2048-bit fingerprint code. Based on the collected database, we report
zero error rates, and the method is shown to work well with different light sources,
and is resistant against various distortions such as crumpling, scribbling, soaking
and heating. The extracted fingerprints contain 807 degrees-of-freedom, which is suf-
ficiently high for many practical applications. As an example, some applications (like
e-passport) rely on a tamper-resistant RFID chip embedded in the paper document for
proving the authenticity of the document (through a challenge-response protocol based
on a long-term secret stored in the chip). Our method provides an alternative solution
that leverages the natural physical properties of the paper document instead of the
tamper resistance of an extra embedded chip.
In this paper, we have focused testing our method on office paper sheets. In future,
we plan to extend our study to other types of paper, such as thermal paper, labels
and passport pages as long as the light can transmit through. However, based on the
thickness of the paper and the difference in the texture materials, we believe it is likely
that some changes in the intensity of the light, camera settings, Gabor filter scale and
orientation will need to be made. These questions will be addressed in the future work.
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